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I. INTRODUCTION
Secession theory, which has become more prominent in a world
that worships self-determination, might have a role to play in the de-
velopment of American Indian law. This article is a call for considera-
tion of how that theory could reinvigorate some American Indian
tribes.
II. ASSIMILATION VERSUS SEPARATION
Federal Indian policy has always dealt, at its nub, with the ques-
tion of whether and to what extent the United States should permit,
encourage, or force the assimilation of American Indians into the ma-
jority society.'
The official status of Indian tribes within the American regime
has fluctuated over time. In some eras, most recently during the
Eisenhower administration, termination of the tribes and assimilation
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. S.B. 1967, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology; M.A. 1972, University of Chicago; J.D. 1979, Cornell Law
School.
1. DAvID H. GErcHs Er AL., FEDERAL IrirAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 25 (3d ed.
1993).
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of tribal members into the larger society have been the explicit goals
of federal policy.2 At other times, preserving tribes as distinct entities
within United States boundaries has been given precedence.3
The present policy is to protect traditional Indian societies as
much as possible and, to a great extent, to maintain their insulation
from the majority society. The separation is not complete: Charles
Wilkinson calls the policy "measured separatism" in that the tribes are
subject to the ultimate power of the United States. Nevertheless, the
separation is substantial and is, if anything, becoming more
entrenched.'
In part, the historical flip-flop in federal policy reflects legitimate
unease with the idea of separation.6 Assimilationist policies have
often been associated with land grabbing and other acts of overreach-
ing by non-Indians, but not all advocates of assimilation have been
badly motivated. Many who have argued for the termination of the
tribes have done so in a good-faith belief that full participation in the
larger society is best for individual Indians-indeed, that treatment of
Indians as men and women endowed with inalienable natural rights
requires no less.' That view may be misguided-at this point I believe
the question remains an open one-but it is not inherently evil.
Good-faith proponents of assimilation might also question, with
political scientist Thomas Flanagan, whether "any group [has] a right
to expect that it can continue to live as it always has."' I cannot prove
2. See JANET A. McDoNN.T, THm DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934
(1991); NICHOLAS C. PEROFF, MENOMINEE DRUMS: TRIBAL TERMINATION AND RESTORATION,
1954-1974 (1982).
3. See S. L'rMAr TYm, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 71-94, 125-50 (1973) (discussing
pre-1887 reservation policy and 1934-53 tribal self-government policy).
4. CHauEs F. WiLxINsoN, AMERICAN INDIANS, TiuM AND THE LAW 14-19 (1987). On
federal plenary power, see Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984).
5. See generally STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RmURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN
POLITICAL RESURGENCE (1988).
6. The unease is not new. See Austin Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARV. L. REv. 167,
174 (1888) (stating that "the ultimate objective point to which all efforts for progress should be
directed is to fix upon the Indian the same personal, legal, and political status which is common
to all other inhabitants").
7. See Nancy 0. Lurie, The Contemporary American Indian Scene, in NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS IN I-STORICAL PERSPECTIVE 156 (Eleanor B. Leacock & Nancy 0. Lurie eds., 1971)
("there is no question that termination and related legislation [in the 1950s] were strongly en-
dorsed by well-meaning legislators who were influenced by analogies to the Negro movement for
civil rights"), quoted in PEROFF, supra note 2, at 64; see also GETCHEs ET AL., supra note 1, at 29
("The inconsistency of having islands of racial groups in a country that fought a civil war and has
spent the last one hundred years struggling to accept the goal of racial integration is a rallying
point for some who would extinguish or revise Indian rights.").
8. Thomas Flanagan, The Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian
Lands and Political Philosophy, 22 CAN. J. PoL. Sc. 589, 600 (1989).
[Vol. 29:385
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it, but I suspect that almost all traditional societies trying to maintain
their existence within the boundaries of industrialized nation-states
cannot make it on their own-that they do not fare well without af-
firmative support from the national governments. If I am right about
that, the existence of these traditional societies is somewhat artificial.
Does a dominant culture have the obligation to preserve aboriginal
societies that, left to their own devices, would decline as a result of
inexorable economic and historical forces?9
Whatever the answer to that question, separation, in the form of
measured separatism, once again became federal policy in the 1960s,
and it has continued to this day. Not all Indians are separated from
the rest of American society,10 of course, but the heart of the Ameri-
can Indian population remains the reservations, most of which are far
from urban centers and even farther from the larger American popu-
lation culturally. About half the American Indian population, which
totals nearly two million persons, resides on or near a reservation." It
is those reservation tribes, which occupy lands that have for decades
(and sometimes centuries) been identified as tribal territory,'2 that I
am concerned with in this article.
III. THEoR=TICAL PROBLEMS WITH SEPARATE
COMMUNITARIAN SocmTIEs
The present political status of reservation Indians within the
United States is theoretically unsound. It is inconsistent with Ameri-
can political philosophy in at least two respects: 3 the relationship of
9. Cf. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 29 ("Is there a basic value in preserving an indige-
nous culture, even at some cost to the dominant culture?").
10. Many Indians have been fully assimilated over the years, and others, pushed by federal
relocation programs in the 1950s, have formed enclaves within American cities, in something like
the time-honored immigrant fashion. See, e.g., JOAN WEIBEL-ORLANDO, INDIAN COUNTRY,
L.A.: MAINTAINING ETHNIC COMMUNrrY IN COMPLEX SOCIETY (1991). Moreover, there are
substantial tribal concentrations near non-Indian population centers, such as Phoenix, Seattle,
and Miami. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 25.
11. See GErcI Es ET AL., supra note 1, at 15. According to 1990 census statistics, the Ameri-
can Indian population is 1.878 million. See BUREAu OF THE CENsUS, AMERICAN INDIAN POPU-
LATION BY TRIBE FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES: 1990, at 1 (1992).
That figure probably should be discounted somewhat because of the self-identification process
used in its collection. See Elouise Schumacher, The Native American Numbers Game-Tribal
Leaders Doubt Population Gain, Suspect 'Wannabes' Covet Benefits, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 23,
1992, at Al.
12. For present purposes, it does not matter how the reservations were created-through
treaty, statute, executive order, or otherwise. Nor does it matter whether legal title to tribal
territories has vested in the tribes.
13. I include constitutional concepts in "American political philosophy," but the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of the American regime go beyond mere legalisms.
1993]
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tribal members to tribal governments, and the relationship of tribes
and their members to the larger, non-Indian society.
A. Tribal Members and Tribal Governments
Without exception, traditional Indian societies-now made up, it
must be remembered, of U.S. citizens 14-- reflect political philosophies
that are much more communitarian than the political philosophy guid-
ing the rest of the American population. The prevailing American
emphasis on individual rights as limitations on governmental power
ends, in many respects, at reservation boundaries. 15
Charles Wilkinson has argued that "[tioday there is widespread
recognition of the general principle that basic human rights include
the right of aboriginal peoples to live and develop their economies
and societies free of the control of the dominant society."' 6 Such a
norm may be developing internationally, but it does not fit well into
the American system.
The posited "basic human right" is a group right. Yes, theorists
have been developing the concept of group rights-rights that exist
above and beyond those that inure to individuals making up
groups' -but the work of these theorists is an extension of accepted
American constitutional principles. For one thing, the right that Wil-
kinson describes is silent about the relationship between individual
14. All American Indians "born within the territorial limits of the United States" are citi-
zens of the United States, regardless of their wishes, as a result of a 1924 statute. Act of June 2,
1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1988)).
15. Barsh and Henderson have criticized federal attempts to subvert tribalism in favor of
"the naked, alienated individualism and formal equality of contemporary American society."
RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMEs Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TIBES AND POLITICAL LIB.
ERTY viii (1980). Robert Williams has decried the "Westernized atomistic worldview" that
makes it difficult for the larger Eurocentric society to see value in Indian cultures. Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 439, 447 (1989);
see also Fred Coyote, Land Holds Families Together, in I WIL Din AN INDIAN 15 (1980), quoted
in GErcHEs ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 ("I make a lousy citizen of the United States because I
have got to have my people, my family, with me all the time. I cannot operate as an
individual.").
16. Charles F. Wilkinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees When Indian Tribes Act as Majority
Societies: The Case of the Winnebago Retrocession, 21 CREIrHTON L. REv. 773, 796-97 (1988)
(footnotes omitted).
17. See Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International
Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991); see generally PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE RIGH-S OF MINORITIES (1991).
18. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal
Ghosts, 48 MD. L. REv. 350 (1989). Indeed, the group rights may be such that in some cases
"group identity is protected even when individuals would not be"-or so it is argued. Id. at 357;
see also Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87 Micr-. L. REv.
1199,1204 (1989)(book review)(Indians' special status "distinguishes them from other American
minorities, which have been largely unsuccessful in pursuing group rights.").
[Vol. 29:385
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 17
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss2/17
INDIAN SECESSION
Indians and the tribes of which they are members. How does one
reconcile group and individual rights when they are in conflict-some-
thing that will inevitably occur in any society?19
When the focus is on individual tribal members and their rela-
tionships to their tribes, the tension with American political philoso-
phy becomes apparent. We have no reason to think that tribal
governments are immune from the incentives and pressures that lead
other governments to abuse power. Yet nothing like the incorpora-
tion doctrine, under which many Bill of Rights principles are deemed
to apply to the states, has developed to cover Indian tribes.2" To the
extent that Bill of Rights principles limit tribal action against individ-
ual tribal members, it is because of federal statute, not the Constitu-
tion.2' And the statute intended to extend such protection to
individual tribal members, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, has
been interpreted so narrowly that members aggrieved by actions of
their tribal governments often have no real recourse against tribal
officials.'
For present purposes, I am willing to concede that the immunity
of tribes from constitutional limitations is not a problem of constitu-
tional dimension. The existence of tribes is recognized in the Indian
Commerce Clause z3 and at the time of the nation's founding, tribes
were obviously not expected to adopt individualistic principles. Be-
cause the tribes were understood by the founders to be different24 -
and separate---the communitarian aspects of tribes presented no di-
rect conflict with constitutional standards.
19. See Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 U. CoN'N'. L. REv. 965, 970 (1989) ("Potential conflict
within a minority group surely complicates the problem of pluralism: is the group, or are its
members, entitled to respect?").
20. See Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959)
(holding that First Amendment establishment clause does not apply to tribes, which "have a
status higher than states").
21. The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of course protect tribal members vis-
a-vis federal and state governments in the same way they protect nonmembers.
22. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (Indian Civil Rights Act held to
create no cause of action for tribal members in federal court; Congress had not explicitly waived
tribal sovereign immunity). The effect of Santa Clara is that, except where habeas corpus relief
is available, tribal members are left with tribal courts to hear their grievances, and those tribal
courts may be controlled by the very people complained about.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Com-
merce ... with the Indian Tribes .... ).
24. I have discussed the founders' conceptions of Indians and blacks in Erik M. Jensen,
Monroe G. McKay and American Indian Law: In Honor of Judge McKay's Tenth Anniversary on
the Federal Bench, 1987 B.Y.U. L. RFv. 1103, 1114-15 (1987).
25. It was generally assumed that the tribes with which the United States would engage in
commerce would exist outside U.S. boundaries--eventually if not immediately-and that in the
long run the tribes would disappear.
1993]
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But we are no longer in the founding period. Members of tribes
within U.S. boundaries are now U.S. citizens, entitled to the protec-
tion of constitutional principles-at least with respect to federal and
state governments.2 6 And even if the effective exemption of tribal
governments from constitutional limitations is not objectionable from
a technical, legal standpoint, it remains more than a little troubling to
have American citizens subject to the power of constitutionally recog-
nized entities-the tribes-when the power of those entities against
tribal members is unconstrained.
B. Tribes, Tribal Members, and the Larger Society
To be sure, the inconsistency between tribal societies and the rest
of America is not apparent to many non-Indians because most reser-
vation tribes are so isolated. But that isolation itself creates a second
point of tension with American political philosophy. A policy of mea-
sured separatism does not comfortably fit the moral teachings of
Brown v. Board of Education,2 7 the landmark school desegregation
case. Among its many virtues, Brown is a statement of the need to
emphasize common, not separatist, values in America.
Brown emphasized that education
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibili-
ties, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.
That passage stresses several points. Most important is the tradi-
tional civilizing role of education. Training for citizenship in a plural-
ist society requires education in common values, but with as diverse a
student body as possible. As J. Harvie Wilkinson explained, "That
was education's social, or to use Professor Bickel's term, 'assimilation-
ist' mission."29
26. See supra note 14. I do not mean to suggest that only citizens benefit from constitu-
tional protections. But surely citizens are entitled to no less protection than is available to others.
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. ld1 at 493 (emphasis added).
29. J. HARVIE WrLInsoN, FROM Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integra-
tion, 1954-1978 at 42 (1979) (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROrRESs 121 (1970)). I understand that not everyone believes the Brown opinion, as
distinguished from the case's result, should be taken seriously today. The assimilationist aspects
[Vol. 29:385
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In one important respect, Brown is irrelevant to American Indi-
ans: the constitutional principles behind Brown are almost certainly
inapplicable to the analysis of Indian separation. Judicial decisions in
recent years have been consistent in finding no equal protection
problems associated with differential treatment of American Indians.
For constitutional analysis, the tribes are political entities, the
Supreme Court has concluded, not racial aggregations.30
But it is hard not to see the tribes as racially defined in important
ways, and many tribal friends have conceded as much. For example,
Charles Wilkinson has put the question bluntly: "Why is it, ultimately,
that this nation should accept the idea of these sovereign governments
whose citizens are determined by race? '"31 Even if one concedes, as I
am willing to do, that the Constitution permits Indian separation as a
legal matter, that separation exists in tension with Brown's moral
principles.
It is no answer to this dilemma to suggest, as some have, that we
face an either/or choice between race-based separation and something
approaching cultural genocide, with the elimination of "Indianness" in
the United States.32 There is no doubt that, if those were the only
possibilities, any reasonable person would opt for separation. In fact,
however, the American experience has preserved many different cul-
tural attributes while simultaneously achieving a great deal of assimi-
lation. The melting pot may not be the best metaphor to describe the
immigrant experience, but neither is it wholly inaccurate.
Full homogenization did not-and probably should not-occur,
but stable nations cannot exist without generally accepted values.
of Brown have fallen by the wayside in a society moving toward multiculturalism. Even those
who have used acceptance of Brown as a prerequisite for judicial appointment have ignored the
assimilative teachings of the case. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 34 N.Y.
REv. Boos, Aug. 13, 1987, at 3. But judicial opinions are important not only because of who
wins; the law of a case is the reasoning.
30. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) ("[hiring preference for Bureau of
Indian Affairs] is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities"). One of the few authors to take seriously the Equal Protection
Clause in Indian law analysis is David Williams. Williams concludes that by its own terms the
clause seems to apply, but he imaginatively argues that it was not intended to apply to tribes.
David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L.
REv. 759 (1991).
31. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 794; see also Williams, supra note 30, at 822:
[I]f racial subnations are an appropriate remedy for the theft of Indian lands and sover-
eignty, they should also be an appropriate remedy for the theft of African-American
lands and sovereignty. At that point the liberal individualist promise of the equal pro-
tection clause seems to disappear into a nightmare of racial homelands.
32. See, e.g., Ga'rcHss ET AT-, supra note 1, at 29 ("Should the role of the law be to homog-
enize society? Or should it be flexible enough to preserve difference and diversity?").
1993]
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Recognizing that some principles are so fundamental to the American
regime that contrary cultural influences must give way in practice, pol-
icy-makers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made a
conscious effort to instill American political values in immigrants. An
easy, albeit more modem, example: no matter how fervent and sincere
segregationists were in voicing opposition to racial integration-as
they were permitted to do by the First Amendment-their views of
the appropriate ordering of society could not prevail.
All of this is not to say that Indian separation must end; in fact, I
have supported the concept in print.33 But the issue is not an easy
one, and the tension with Brown is real. Justifications for Indian sepa-
ration in a nation that condemns racial segregation exist, but they are
not self-evident.
C. Why the Issues Will Not Go Away
Consideration of further changes in the federal-state-tribal rela-
tionship is, I suggest, inevitable. The philosophical tension between
the tribal islands of communitarianism (comprised of U.S. citizens)
and the sea of liberal individualism surrounding those islands, coupled
with the tension between a policy of separation and the principles of
Brown, is sufficiently great that the issues cannot be ignored forever.
Those tensions do not seem compelling to everyone, I admit, and
most of the American population loses no sleep worrying about In-
dian separation. The contrast is enough, however, that it prevents the
tension from disappearing completely from the public consciousness.
Compromise is difficult, if not impossible. Of course, both com-
munitarian and individualistic values will be represented in any soci-
ety and, while I characterize the majority American society as
individualistic, I recognize that there is a communitarian revival of
sorts going on.34 But the fact that a "revival" is deemed necessary
underscores the limited role communitarianism has played in Ameri-
can life-at least recently. And the revival is largely inapplicable to
my concerns because it has focused on recreating a sense of duty to
the larger society, not on building a sense of community within small
groups. (That latter sense of "community" can lead to factionalism at
its worst.) In short, the U.S. government cannot countenance a signif-
icant diminution in the importance of individual rights without funda-
mentally changing the American regime. On the other hand, neither
33. See Jensen, supra note 24, at 1136-37.
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can tribes become substantially more individualistic-adapting to ma-
jority American views on individual rights-without changing in basic
ways.
Separation, too, is a difficult issue for significant compromise
given the moral principles of Brown. Promises were indeed made to
the Indian tribes, but promises should not trump higher values? We
need to look elsewhere for principles to rationalize the political status
of reservation Indians within the American regime.
IV. Two PossIBLE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
The theoretical problems could be resolved in either of two dia-
metric ways.36 Complete assimilation would eliminate the tensions,
with individual Indians' becoming full participants in the larger soci-
ety. By definition, the relationships of tribal members to their tribes
and of the tribes to the larger society become nonissues if there are no
longer any tribes. That was the position taken in the early Eisen-
hower administration.37
Since the 1960s, however, full assimilation has not been seriously
considered in high government circles. 38 Nor is it a view evident in
academia-at least not among those specializing in American Indian
law.
35. See WILINsoN, supra note 4, at 6:
[E]ven if separate lands were promised to tribal control more than a century ago, how
can the United States, consistent with its democratic ideals, allow race-based Indian
tribes to govern the non-Indians who have lawfully entered those lands to live and to
do business over the course of the ensuing generations?
See also Williams, supra note 30, at 815:
[P]romise-keeping is never an absolute value in constitutional law, nor should it be
when in tension with other constitutional values. Suppose, for example, that the fed-
eral government had solemnly promised the antebellum Cherokees that they could
keep their black slaves and the federal government would return escaped slaves.... If
the reservation system really does rest on racial classifications, then, a mere promise
would not save it.
36. A third possibility is that American society might become indifferent to increasing trib-
alism-that is, that what I have loosely called "American political philosophy" might change in
fundamental ways. For the purposes of this article, however, I take the individualist (and assimi-
lationist) premises of twentieth century America as givens.
37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, the architect
of the Eisenhower attempt at termination, is often portrayed as a villain, but he did operate from
principle: "He exalted individual initiative and private property; and he looked with deep suspi-
cion upon a policy putting group interests before those of the individual." GARY ORPIELD, A
SrtuDY OF THE TERMINATION PoLIcy ch. 6, at 1 (1965), quoted in PEROFF, supra note 2, at 59.
38. Legislation is occasionally introduced that would return Indian policy to an assimilation-
ist goal, but in recent years none has survived the initial stages of the legislative process. See
BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 15, at 291.
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The other extreme, the revival of the tribes as fully sovereign na-
tions, has had more supporters. The late D'Arcy McNickle, for exam-
ple, urged that the United States "[r]eturn the right of decision to the
tribes-restore their power to hold the dominant society at arm's
length."39
If we (and here I mean non-Indians generally) were starting from
scratch in putting together the American nation-state, we might well
decide-presumptuously, as if it were our decision alone-that Indian
tribes should remain as separate nations, and that those nations could
hold the dominant society on the North American continent at bay.40
Certainly we would want to avoid the historical flow that gave rise to
so many inequities. We would want to treat the tribes and their mem-
bers as equals and to keep the nation's promises.
Had history taken such a different course, with tribal nation-
states populating the North American continent, the tribes would now
govern themselves, and they would deal with the United States on a
nation-to-nation basis. Such a state of affairs would not be without
drawbacks: a world made up of racially and ethnically defined nation-
states is not one that I am comfortable with. But there is nothing
necessarily wrong with states formed on racial or ethnic bases, so long
as the exclusionary principles do not depend on any perceived inferi-
ority of the excluded populations. As Barsh and Henderson argue,
pointing to Italy and Japan, "The mere fact that a political unit has a
racial characteristic does not render it racist." 41 Indeed, the interna-
tional law movement toward self-determination of "peoples" presup-
poses the possibility of racial or ethnic determination.
If we want to take the idea of separate Indian nations seriously-
and I assume many do4----we cannot simply turn back the clock. We
need to consider how to get there from where we now are. And while
39. DARCY McNiCIaK, THEY CAME HERE FmsT 285 (rev. ed. 1975); see also Russel L.
Barsh, Indigenous North America and Contemporary International Law, 62 OR. L. REv. 73(1983); Rachel San Kranowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering
the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 586-602 (1987).
40. Boundary issues might still arise, and the very idea of distinct boundaries to tribal lands
might cause some cultural discomfort among the tribes. Nevertheless, the idea of tribes as fully
sovereign nations does no violence to sovereignty notions.
41. BAgsH & HENDERSON, supra note 15, at 246.
42. One might question whether all who argue for fully sovereign status for tribes really
mean it, or whether they assume that the federal government will always provide a safety net.
For an example of an article curiously calling for just about every step in "decolonization" except
actual severing of federal-tribal ties, see Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest:
A Vision for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77 (1993).
[Vol. 29:385
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complete separation could be a theoretically pure position-consis-
tent with constitutionally derived moral and legal principles-its pro-
ponents provide little or no analysis of how to arrive at the desired
result starting from the present doctrinal position. It is not enough to
wish that the last several centuries be undone.
V. A ROLE FOR SECESSION THEORY?
In particular, the new separatist writings contain no references to
secession theory, which is enjoying a revival in other contexts. 43 A
resurgence in academic writing on secession has been fueled by sev-
eral extra-academic factors: the breakup of eastern European nation-
states, the possible disintegration of the Canadian federation, and the
strengthening of self-determination as a goal for peoples of the
world.44
Consider this statement by philosopher Allen Buchanan:
[N]either side [in the debates between individualism and communi-
tarianism] has taken seriously the possibility of secession as a way of
preserving a general commitment to liberal institutions while ac-
commodating the fact that there are some forms of community that
cannot flourish within the liberal state but which it would be wrong
to try to force to conform.45
Buchanan is not writing about America's indigenous populations, but
his words suggest a plausible basis for further separation of at least
some Indian tribes from the United States. If there is to be a doctrine
43. Recent books on secession include MILICA Z. BOOKMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF SECES-
SION (1993); ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALI=Y OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITUMAA AND QUEBEC (1991); LEE C. BuCHImrr, SECESSION: THE LEGIT-
MACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); GREGORY CRAVEN, SECESSION: THE ULTIMATE STATES
RIGHT (1986) (Australia). Articles include Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A
Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theory of
Secession, 1991 ETmcs 362 (1991); Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Cm. L.
REv. 633 (1991).
44. The literature on group rights of aboriginal peoples is burgeoning. See, e.g., WILL KYM-
LICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); BRYAN ScHWARTz, FIRST PRINCIPLES,
SECOND THOUGHTS: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND CANADIAN STATE-
CRAFT (1986); Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty:
An Essay on R. v. Sparrow, 29 ALBERTA L. REv. 498 (1991); John R. Danley, Liberalism, Ab-
original Rights, and Cultural Minorities, 20 PmL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 168 (1991); L. C. Green, Ab-
original Peoples, International Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN.
B. REv. 339 (1983); Douglas Sanders, The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Questions in Interna-
tional Law, in CAN. Hum. RTs. Y.B. 1983 (W. Pentney & D. Proulx eds., 1983); Torres, supra
note 17.
45. BUCHANAN, supra note 43, at 5. The Amish might be cited as a group that should not
be forced to conform, even though the Amish presumably are not contemplating secession. See
Jensen, supra note 24, at 1136-37 (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
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of secession at all-and not all would agree there should be4 6 -some
Indian tribes seem to be prime candidates. They have many factors on
their side, including acknowledged territory; a history of separation
from the dominant society and resistance to full assimilation; and self-
government (at least in part). Indigenous societies that have at no
time come close to assimilation-but which have found themselves ar-
tificially incorporated into larger nation-states-are attractive candi-
dates to sever purely formal ties.
At this point, I can present no unequivocal conclusion that seces-
sion is in fact a theoretical possibility for American Indian tribes.
Much more work is needed, and in this essay I intend merely to call
for further scholarly exploration of this issue.
Obviously the secession issue is, in part, an artificial one.
Whatever the justifications for complete separation, it can occur only
with the consent of the American federal government.47 No argu-
ments in an academic law review can ever lead, by themselves, to such
a substantial change in policy-or so one hopes. Furthermore, not all
tribes can seriously consider secession. Some are so small, in both
population and territory, that full nationhood is implausible. And for
most tribes, including some with sizeable populations, economic self-
sufficiency is a dream. Unless it were to be coupled with substantial
severance payments,48 secession from the United States would mean
economic disaster for those tribes.
I nonetheless believe in the importance of this exercise. The se-
cession issue is an academic one, but it is not only that. Theoretical
arguments do have force and, when coupled with the practical pres-
sures for increased separation, they could tip the balance, at least in
the case of some of the more populous and more economically self-
sufficient tribes. The time has come for those Indian law theorists
who press for increased separation to study the literature of secession
and to put together the strongest possible body of theoretical argu-
ments on its behalf.
46. I admit to many reservations about the concept, perhaps because of its suspect history
in the United States.
47. See Newton, supra note 4 (describing federal plenary power doctrine).
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